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NAKED SELF-INTEREST? WHY THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
RESISTS GATEKEEPING 
Sung Hui Kim* 
Abstract 
This Article asks and answers the following question: why does the 
legal profession resist gatekeeping? Or, put another way, why do lawyers 
resist duties that require them to act to avert harm to their corporate client, 
its own shareholders, and—possibly—the capital markets? While 
acknowledging that the economic self-interest of the profession is an 
undeniable force fueling the bar’s opposition to gatekeeping, this Article 
argues that the characterization of naked rent-seeking behavior is too 
simplistic. It argues that economic self-interest exerts a more subtle 
influence than the conventional story would suggest. In addition, the legal 
profession’s resistance to gatekeeping is grounded in lawyers’ 
internalization of attitudes held by the corporate managers serving as the 
clients’ representatives and lawyers’ lack of empathy for potential 
shareholder-victims. In short, under-examined psychological forces other 
than economic self-interest loom large in the profession’s resistance to 
gatekeeping. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 10, 2009, after an eight week federal jury trial, Joseph P. 
Collins was found guilty of securities and wire fraud. He was convicted for 
scheming with the executives of now-bankrupt financial services and 
commodities brokerage firm, Refco,1 to conceal $2.4 billion of debt from 
lenders and investors.2 What’s interesting is that Collins wasn’t one of 
                                                                                                                     
 * Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Please send comments to: 
kim.sung@law.ucla.edu. I am grateful for advice received from George Cohen, Robert Gordon, 
Jerry Kang, Kimberly Krawiec, and Albert Moore. Excellent research assistance was provided by 
Denis Buckle, Nadisha Foster, Mahima Raghav, and the research librarians of the Hugh and Hazel 
Darling UCLA School of Law Library and the Leigh H. Taylor Southwestern University Law Library. 
 1. “Refco” refers to Refco Group Ltd. and its successor entity Refco Inc. 
 2. Chad Bray, Former Refco Lawyer Convicted of Fraud, Conspiracy, WALL ST. J., July 11, 
2009; Mark Hamblett, Attorney Convicted of 5 Counts in $2.4 Billion Federal Fraud, 242 N.Y. 
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those executives. He was instead their lawyer. And he wasn’t just a small 
solo practitioner acting as the prototypical “mob” lawyer. Instead, Collins 
was a partner of the large and prestigious law firm of Mayer Brown LLP 
and head of the firm’s derivatives practice. 
According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Garcia, Collins 
played an indispensable role in facilitating “massive sham loan 
transactions.”3 Garcia accused Collins of enabling Refco executives to hide 
hundreds of millions of dollars in debt by concealing various “round trip” 
loan transactions in which Refco parked debt at a holding company during 
accounting reviews and shortly thereafter moved the debt back to Refco.4 
Garcia also argued that Collins prepared documents that lied about the 
company’s debt position, duping a private equity firm which bought a 
controlling stake in Refco, and later enabling Refco executives to fleece 
public investors to the tune of $500 million.5 
“Why? Why did [Collins] lie for Refco?” Garcia asked the jury with 
rhetorical flourish. “Because it was his biggest client from 1997 through 
the collapse of Refco. This man made more than $40 million for his firm.”6 
Taking the stand, Collins claimed, perhaps predictably, the defense of 
ignorance: “I didn’t personally spend a lot of time. I delegated them . . . . I 
didn’t structure them. I didn’t negotiate them. I didn’t talk to customers 
about them. They just didn’t require much of my time.”7 Collins insisted 
that it was not his job to monitor his client’s transactions, which would 
have simply been impossible. 
We may never know the ultimate truth about “whether Joe Collins was 
on the inside or the outside—whether [the executives] kept him out of the 
loop, whether they kept him at arm’s length, whether they lied to him so he 
could represent Refco.”8 Nevertheless, Collins’ claim that he just didn’t 
know remains troubling in light of Refco’s long rap sheet of rogue 
transactions and prior criminal prosecutions9 and the bizarre nature of 
various loan transactions. It’s frankly tough to understand how Collins 
could have missed the red flags. As one former Mayer Brown lawyer 
noted, “It’s hard for me to understand how anyone could work on loan 
documents and not ask, ‘What is the purpose behind this loan?’ . . . . When 
you’re doing a financing, knowing the use of proceeds is important to 
understand whether the loan is illegal.”10 At the very least, the conviction 
                                                                                                                     
L.J., July 13, 2009, at 1. 
 3. Mark Hamblett, Defense Claims Refco Officials Lied to Lawyers About Fraud, 241 N.Y. 
L.J., May 14, 2009, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. Id.; Mark Hamblett, Collins Takes Stand to Defend His Role as Attorney for Refco, 241 
N.Y. L.J., June 19, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter Hamblett, Collins Takes Stand]; Mark Hamblett, Judge 
Declines to Grant Mistrial over Jury Unrest in Collins Case, 242 N.Y. L.J., July 10, 2009, at 1. 
 5. Hamblett, supra note 3; Hamblett, Collins Takes Stand, supra note 4. 
 6. Hamblett, supra note 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7. Hamblett, Collins Takes Stand, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8. Hamblett, supra note 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9. See Susan Beck, Target Practice, 30 AM. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 84, 87 (recounting the 
history of citations and criminal sentences of Refco’s former executives—stretching back to 1969). 
 10. Id. at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of Collins is a stunning reminder that the problem of lawyers’ acquiescence 
in massive financial frauds hasn’t gone away and won’t anytime soon.11  
The last major scandal plagued with allegations of lawyer misconduct12 
is now known by the single word “Enron.” When that disaster was brought 
to light, Congress responded swiftly by enacting § 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley § 307” or just “§ 307”),13 the “first 
federal statute in American history to regulate lawyers directly and 
broadly.”14 The statute gave to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) an explicit, sweeping mandate to establish “minimum standards of 
professional conduct” for lawyers “appearing and practicing before the 
Commission in any way in the representation of [public] issuers.”15 By 
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley § 307, Congress formally recognized lawyers’ 
role as “gatekeepers”—“private intermediaries who can prevent harm to 
the securities markets by disrupting the misconduct of their client 
representatives.”16  
But, as any lawyer then practicing recalls, the legal profession was 
horrified by this pro-regulatory turn of events. Just as it had done in 
previous battles with the SEC over lawyers’ gatekeeping obligations,17 the 
organized bar18 aggressively lobbied against the passage of § 307.19 When 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Indeed, sometimes lawyers are the primary perpetrators of fraud. For a recent news story, 
see, for example, Benjamin Weiser, Lawyer Pleads Guilty in $400 Million Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 
12, 2009, at A23 (reporting on New York lawyer Marc S. Dreier’s guilty plea for perpetrating a 
fraud of $400 million). 
 12. See Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 
73, 89 n.110 (2010) (summarizing law firms’ alleged involvement in the Enron scandal); Milton C. 
Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2005) (discussing the assumption of 
lawyers’ required services in the Enron scandal). 
 13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006)). 
 14. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of 
the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2006). Professor William Simon notes that the 
second such federal statute was the “‘Jobs Act’” provision, which requires tax advisors to disclose 
transactions having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion. Id. at 1453 & n.2. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). As further defined by the regulations, lawyers deemed to be 
“appearing and practicing before the Commission” (and thus covered by Part 205) include all 
lawyers who communicate with the SEC, represent issuers in their dealings with the SEC, and 
advise on matters pertaining to securities laws. See Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6297 (Feb. 6, 
2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)(i)–(iii) (2006)) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule]. Also, only 
attorneys for SEC-reporting companies are covered by the rule. See id. § 205.2(h).  
 16. This definition of “gatekeepers” first appeared in Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413 (2008), but is modified and adapted from that set forth in Reinier 
H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 53 (1986) (describing “gatekeeper liability” as “liability imposed on private parties who are 
able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). 
 17. Those gatekeeping battles are discussed in Kim, supra note 12, at 77–93 (canvassing the 
battles going back to the 1970s). 
 18. For simplicity and ease of reading, I will often refer to the view from “the organized bar,” 
or “the legal profession” to represent what I have found to be the dominant voice that has emerged 
3
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those efforts failed, lawyers circled the wagons and fought against the 
SEC’s rulemaking to implement § 307.20 The bar took special aim at the 
SEC’s two “noisy withdrawal” proposals. These proposals (1) required 
lawyers to resign if intra-corporate remedies to rectify material law 
violations proved to be futile and (2) required lawyers (or, alternatively, 
companies) to report lawyers’ withdrawal “based on professional 
considerations” to the SEC.21 (Auditors have been subject to a similar 
reporting obligation since 1995.)22 Just as predictably, the SEC backed 
down from its noisy withdrawal proposals, making both the notice to the 
SEC and the lawyer’s withdrawal entirely discretionary. 
At the core of the bar’s opposition was hostility to the general notion 
of “lawyer as gatekeeper”—that lawyers should have any obligations to 
the public or the capital markets that could put them at odds with their 
client representatives. Although the bar might tolerate lawyers as attack 
dogs (at least unofficially in advertisements23 and beauty contests), it 
rejects both officially and unofficially the idea of lawyers as watchdogs.24 
Official comments in the SEC administrative rulemaking process 
complained that the proposed rules could “eviscerate the attorney’s 
                                                                                                                     
within the legal profession to protest external regulation by the SEC. However, I acknowledge that 
there is no monolithic view of the bar and that our legal profession comprises heterogeneous 
communities of lawyers with competing normative visions. See, e.g., Theodore Schneyer, 
Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code, in LAWYERS’ 
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 95, 140 
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (noting the “heterogeneity of ethical views” within the legal 
profession); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter 
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 96–109 (2006) (identifying the anti-tax shelter faction of the tax 
bar). 
 19. See Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 
220–21 (2003). 
 20. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 579 (2009) (“It is widely believed that the ABA 
moved to adopt the amendments to Rule 1.13 and Rule 1.6 to forestall the SEC’s consideration and 
adoption of the proposed mandatory noisy withdrawal regulations.”). 
 21. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002); Implementation of Standards 
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 
(proposed Jan. 29, 2003). 
 22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. IV 1998); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 301(b)(3), 109 Stat. 737, 762, 763 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(3) 
(2006)).  
 23. Florida Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 242–43 (Fla. 2005) (barring attorney Marc Andrew 
Chandler from displaying his ad featuring a spike-collared canine with the catchy “1-800-PIT-
BULL”); Nathan Koppel, Objection! Funny Legal Ads Draw Censure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2008, at 
A1. 
 24. See, e.g., Letter from Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n 8 (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/Sarbanes-
Oxley%20Comments.pdf [hereinafter ABCNY 2002 Letter] (“[The proposed rules] assign a 
“watchdog” function to attorneys. . . . [A]ttorneys are required to report the misconduct of others 
even where the attorney played no role in any of the actions that led to the violation.”).  
4
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traditional role as advocate, confidant and advisor”25 and “risk destroying 
the trust and confidence many issuers have up to now placed in their legal 
counsel.”26 They worried that the proposals would “drive a wedge between 
client and the counsel who advised it on a matter”27 and decried that “the 
Commission would be using the attorney as the Commission’s eyes and 
ears to build a case against the client.”28 Lawyers maintained that by 
“requiring attorneys to police and pass judgment on their clients,”29 
lawyers for corporations would slide down the slippery slope from trusted 
counselor to policeman.30  
Since the SEC’s retraction of its noisy withdrawal proposals, much of 
the furor over gatekeeping has waned. But the battles are far from over. 
After the regulations promulgated under Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 were 
enacted, the American Bar Association (ABA) published a carefully 
crafted statement asserting that “lawyers for the corporation . . . are not 
‘gatekeepers’ of corporate responsibility in the same fashion as public 
accounting firms.”31 Also, the Washington and California state bar 
associations openly flouted the SEC’s authority to adopt its regulations 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See, e.g., id. 
 26. Letter from Am. Bar Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 26 (Dec. 
18, 2002) [hereinafter ABA Letter].  
 27. See, e.g., Letter from 77 Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77lawfirms1.htm [hereinafter 
Law Firms Letter]; ABA Letter, supra note 26 (“We believe that [the SEC proposals] . . . risk 
destroying the trust and confidence many issuers have up to now placed in their legal counsel, 
creating divided loyalties and driving a wedge into the attorney-client relationship.”). 
 28. Letter from Debevoise & Plimpton to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/debevoise1.htm. 
 29. Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n  
(Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/sullivanc1.htm (“By effectively 
requiring attorneys to police and pass judgment on their clients, the basic attorney-client is altered 
fundamentally—instead of viewing attorneys as confidential advisors, clients may begin to view 
their attorneys as also being agents of the Commission. The resulting chilling effect on 
communications could result in less attorney involvement . . . .”). 
 30. See, e.g., Letter from Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/bnagler1.htm (noting that the 
proposed rules “take an unprecedented and unnecessary step toward changing the role of a 
corporate lawyer from one of a trusted legal counselor to one of a whistle-blowing policeman”); 
Letter from Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 7, 
2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/acca040703.htm [hereinafter ACCA 2003 Letter] 
(“If we move toward regulations that turn lawyers into cops on the beat, we will be making a 
decision to fundamentally change the lawyer-client relationship from one based on trust and advice, 
to one inclined toward prosecutorial responsibilities.”); Letter from Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility 
& Conduct, State Bar of Cal. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 4, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/copracsbc040403.htm (“The Commission rules requiring or 
permitting disclosure of corporate secrets outside the corporate structure, however, will necessarily 
subvert and turn on its head the relationship of trust between client and lawyer.”). 
 31. Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 145, 156 (2003). 
5
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(notwithstanding § 307).32 Still today, the bar continues to denounce the 
SEC for targeting lawyers who are merely “engaged in what lawyers do,” 
as if to suggest that lawyers should be immune from liability so long as 
their complicity is mediated through “legal services.”33 
And Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 may turn out to be just a prelude of things to 
come. As recently as July 30, 2009, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania 
introduced a bill34 that would effectively reverse a 1994 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision that shielded law firms, accounting firms, and investment 
banks from investor lawsuits alleging aiding and abetting violations of § 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the principal anti-fraud provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.35 And in a brief filed on August 6, 2009, the SEC 
argued that law firms should be held primarily liable for knowingly 
providing false and misleading statements in companies’ public 
disclosures.36 As the Collins conviction demonstrates, lawyers’ complicity 
in corporate securities fraud remains a timely, if understudied, issue. 
In this Article, I ask and answer a fundamental question: why does the 
legal profession so stridently resist gatekeeping?37 After all, aren’t lawyers 
supposed to be “officers of the legal system,” as touted by the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct?38 Or, even if you reject that 
                                                                                                                     
 32. See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 
49 VILL. L. REV 725, 799–808 (2004) (describing the SEC’s stand-off with the Washington and 
California state bar associations, which challenged the SEC’s authority to implement portions of 
Part 205 regulations). 
 33. See, e.g., David B. Bayless, Recent SEC Enforcement Actions Against In-House Lawyers: 
Its Impact on Legal and Compliance, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 2008: LEGAL, ETHICAL & 
STRATEGIC ISSUES 665, 670, 676 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1679, 
2008) (“[L]awyers, when engaged in what lawyers do, should not normally be the subject of 
enforcement actions. . . . Even assuming the SEC’s allegations are true . . . , the type of conduct that 
those in-house lawyers engaged in is the type of conduct that lawyers typically undertake . . . . It is 
unusual, to say the least, for these types of actions to be the subject of an SEC enforcement action 
for securities fraud.”). The implication that lawyers should be exempt from liability for providing 
legal assistance contradicts principles of tort, agency and criminal law, which do not excuse lawyers 
whose assistance furthers illegality. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in 
Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 677–83 (1981). 
 34. See Liability for Aiding & Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong. (2009); Ameet Sachdev, SEC Takes Sword to Shield Protecting Lawyers from Investors’ Suits, 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-08-11/news/0908100445_1_mayer-
brown-refco-securities-fraud. 
 35. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994). 
 36. The SEC stated that a third party also may be primarily liable if the entity provides the 
false or misleading information that another person puts into a false statement. Brief for the SEC, 
Amicus Curiae, In Support of the Position of Plaintiffs-Appellants on the Issue Addressed and in 
Support of Neither Affirmance nor Reversal at 6, Pac. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 
144 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1619-cv). 
 37. See Kim, supra note 12. Elsewhere, I have addressed the related but separate question of 
how lawyers go about waging their war against gatekeeping and what rhetorical techniques they 
employ to make their case. In this Article, I seek to explore why lawyers resist gatekeeping duties.  
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE: A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES (2010) (“A 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/4
2011] WHY THE LEGAL PROFESSION RESISTS GATEKEEPING 135 
 
characterization, why do lawyers resist duties that only require them to 
avert gross harm to their corporate clients? We are now too familiar with 
the chaos unleashed by the massive frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Refco, 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, and Bear Stearns Asset 
Management Fund. So, why does the legal profession resist measures 
designed to avert potential financial calamity? 
For many readers, the answer will be obvious: “It’s the money, stupid!” 
Or in more scholar-speak, “It’s about economic self-interest.” Indeed, no 
lawyer wants to expand her financial liability with duties backed by civil or 
administrative sanction, and no profession wants to be shackled with 
additional rules that raise the costs of legal practice. On the one hand, 
economic self-interest is an undeniable force fueling the bar’s opposition to 
gatekeeping. On the other hand, the characterization of naked rent-seeking 
behavior misses crucial subtleties and portrays a degree of “naive 
cynicism”—the inclination to think that others are more prone to bias than 
oneself could ever be.39 While economic self-interest plays an important 
role here, it exerts a more complex influence than conventionally 
understood. Moreover, there are motivations other than self-interest that 
loom large in the bar’s resistance to gatekeeping. And these complexities 
should inform our legal and social responses. 
In Part I, I examine the role that economic self-interest plays in the 
bar’s script of resistance. Drawing on insights from social cognition,40 I 
advance an alternative understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by 
which self-interest shapes the bar’s public stance. In Parts II and III, I 
identify two other psychological forces that influence the bar’s motivations 
in subtle ways. First, lawyers overwhelmingly tend to internalize the anti-
regulatory attitudes held by those senior corporate managers who typically 
serve as lawyers’ de facto clients.41 Although lawyers’ self-interest is a 
                                                                                                                     
lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”). Although 
attorney professional conduct is governed by the rules promulgated by the highest court in the state 
in which the attorney practices, most state professional conduct codes are modeled after the ABA’s 
Model Rules.  
 39. See, e.g., Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False 
Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499 (2008); Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the 
Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 680 (2005); Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling “Holier Than Thou”: Are 
Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 861 (2000); Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, “Naive Cynicism” in Everyday 
Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 743 (1999); Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and 
Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53 (1998). 
 40. Social cognition is the intersection between the traditionally separate fields of social 
psychology and cognitive psychology. For an overview of social cognition, see SUSAN T. FISKE & 
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE (2008). 
 41. For the vast majority of legal representations and all representations governed by 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 307, the corporation is the de jure client, not any of its constituents, including the 
board, shareholders, or managers. However, given that all lawyers report directly or indirectly to 
7
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factor here as well, cognitive dissonance mechanisms more robustly 
explain this internalization phenomenon. Second, lawyers are inclined to 
be indifferent to (if not downright dismissive about) the interests of their 
clients’ shareholders who stand to be the greatest beneficiaries of lawyer 
gatekeeping. Again, I do not deny the likely contributions of lawyers’ self-
interest here. But I argue that the abstractness of shareholders greatly 
hinders lawyers’ ability to empathize with these particular victims of 
corporate malfeasance. 
As supporting evidence, I offer primarily, though not exclusively, the 
rhetoric of the organized bar in opposition to the SEC’s attempt to 
implement Part 205 regulations under Sarbanes-Oxley § 307. The 
particular source of rhetoric that I excavate comprises the bar’s official 
comments filed during the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, and I 
pay special attention to those comments filed by collections of prominent 
law firms and bar associations.42 To be sure, there are inherent limitations 
in any attempt to generalize about professional views from published 
sources, let alone the particular subset that I explore. Nonetheless, the 
carefully vetted nature of these comments should ensure that they are a 
reasonably representative sample of the official views from the bar.43 
Although this Article mainly addresses lawyers’ disputed role as capital 
markets’ gatekeepers, it also illuminates the broader debate over whether 
“lawyers should help or resist their clients’ attempts to evade or nullify 
regulation”44 and whether lawyers are entitled to adopt the “Holmesian bad 
                                                                                                                     
senior corporate managers who are vested with the authority to define corporate objectives and 
direct lawyers’ activities, these managers serve as lawyers’ de facto clients. See Sung Hui Kim, The 
Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1008 
(2005); Kim, supra note 16, at 443–44. 
 42. Let me briefly describe my methodology. On its Web site, the SEC listed 252 official 
comments to the Part 205 proposals. Due to errors on the Web site, only 243 of the comments were 
actually available for download. First, I personally reviewed carefully all the major comment 
letters—those submitted by large clusters of law firms, bar associations, and individual law firms 
who are reputable in the field of securities practice for purposes of understanding the types of 
arguments commonly asserted by the bar. I more quickly reviewed the rest. Second, two student 
research assistants coded the comment letters for the specific types of arguments made (e.g., lawyer 
as “zealous advocate,” SEC as “prosecutor,” or contrasting lawyers with auditors). Finally, I 
downloaded the comments into a database, which allowed me to conduct targeted text search 
queries. Comments on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml (last 
modified Apr. 22, 2004). 
 43. Because only those law firms who regularly practice securities law are likely to even 
know about the SEC’s solicitation of comments or the filing procedures, comments filed with the 
SEC are likely to represent the views from those who have the greatest stake in the matter. And 
since these participants generally understand that their filed comments will be published on the 
SEC’s public Web site, comments are likely to be carefully vetted before filing and thus will tend to 
reflect the central tendency of views of their constituents, as opposed to outlier views. Finally, since 
Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 represents the most recent and significant battle over gatekeeping obligations 
between the SEC and the bar, comments will tend to reflect, more or less, current understandings of 
the bar.  
 44. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1988). 
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man view of law,”45 which approaches the law as if law were the enemy.46 
These, too, are questions that will not recede anytime soon. 
II.  PURSUING LAWYERS’ SELF-INTEREST 
Professor Deborah Rhode could not have said it more bluntly: 
“[Lawyers’ c]oncern about third-party lawsuits is the elephant in the room 
when bar ethics rules are debated.”47 None of this should surprise anyone 
who is familiar with either the history of the bar’s professional rule-
making48 or the decades of social cognition research showing that we are 
motivated by our own economic self-interest49 and that we tend to conflate 
“fairness” with that which benefits ourselves financially.50 For example, in 
one classic study, student subjects were asked to imagine that they had 
worked different durations at a collaborative task. They were then queried 
as to what a just compensation would be both for themselves and for others 
who had “worked” more or less than they.51 Subjects who “worked” longer 
hours tended to claim that an equal hourly wage was fair. Subjects who 
“worked” shorter hours tended to claim that equal pay, regardless of the 
number of hours worked, was fair.52 In other words, their answers 
indicated that their fairness judgments were compromised by their desire 
for more money.53 
In this particular experiment, no real money was on the line. But 
similar results have been confirmed in experiments with actual payoffs54 
and field studies in the real world.55 Indeed, the existence of the self-
serving bias is amply supported in the theoretical and empirical literature.56 
                                                                                                                     
 45. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1172–73 
(2005). 
 46. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 
35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (2003) (describing this “libertarian-antinomian” view); Kim, supra 
note 41, at 1013–14. 
 47. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1333 (2006). 
 48. Schneyer, supra note 18, at 132–35 (noting the bar’s preoccupation with matters of self-
protection in crafting the Model Rules). 
 49. See Kim, supra note 41, at 1027–29, for a summary of research on the self-serving bias. 
 50. See id. at 1028. 
 51. David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 418, 432, 434 (1979). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 434 (“[P]eople are capable of ignoring or compromising what they know to be 
ethically correct in order to achieve a hedonically more preferred outcome.”). 
 54. See David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, in 
EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 76–79 (David M. Messick 
& Karen S. Cook eds., 1983) (reporting on results of field study performed by Professor Eddy Van 
Avermaet).  
 55. See Kim, supra note 41, at 1028–29 (summarizing field studies, including public school 
teacher contract negotiations and practicing physicians recommending treatments or prescribing 
drugs for the sake of small gifts supplied by pharmaceutical companies and equipment suppliers). 
 56. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining the Bargaining Impasse: The Role of 
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997); see also Kim, supra note 41, at 1027–29 
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Comment letters confirm lawyers’ fear that gatekeeping duties might 
create further liability. Quite explicitly, they argue that lawyers “should not 
be exposed to liability for lapses in governance”;57 urge that lawyers not be 
sanctioned other than in connection with SEC disciplinary proceedings 
under Rule 102(e);58 assert that the SEC’s proposed rules “unreasonably 
increase[] counsel’s exposure to lawsuits by private litigants”;59 warn that 
following the SEC’s proposed rules “will inevitably draw the lawyer into 
litigation”;60 and urge that the SEC “expressly reaffirm its historic policy 
of restraint in bringing actions against attorneys for violation of 
professional conduct rules . . . .”61 
And, for some, the issue is not merely one of higher regulatory burdens 
but of baseline survival. Comment letters suggest that following the SEC 
rules would lead to “career suicide,”62 be “career-ending,”63 or result in 
lawyers being “‘black-balled’ as to future representations.”64 Lawyers also 
fear that, one day, they may become structurally irrelevant. Comment 
letters voice concern that the “fallout” will be nothing less than the 
exclusion of “lawyers from the inner councils of the corporation”65 or 
being “shut out of the client’s inner circle”;66 clients “avoiding counsel 
                                                                                                                     
(summarizing the research on the self-serving bias). 
 57. ABCNY 2002 Letter, supra note 24, at 21. 
 58. Id. at 43–46. 
 59. Id. at 47–48; see also Comments of Corp., Fin. & Sec. Law Section of the D.C. Bar to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s74502/cfslsdcbar040703.htm (“In attempting to comply with the part, the attorney will risk 
substantial personal liability, if the issuer or client then sues the attorney for the losses.”); Letter 
from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 
18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/efgreene1.htm (“[T]he Commission’s 
formulation . . . creates the risk that shareholders could seek to sue attorneys for breach of duties.”). 
 60. Letter from N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 8 (Apr. 1, 2003), http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications96_0.pdf 
[hereinafter NYCLA Letter] (“Any announcement that a lawyer has withdrawn for ‘professional 
considerations’ is nothing more than an invitation to investigate the reasons for the lawyer’s 
withdrawal. . . . It will inevitably draw the lawyer into litigation . . . .”). 
 61. ABA Letter, supra note 26, at 33 (“[I]t is important that the Commission expressly 
reaffirm its historic policy of restraint in bringing actions against attorneys for violation of 
professional conduct rules because of the chilling effect such actions would have on the ability of 
attorneys to effectively represent clients before the Commission.”). 
 62. Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman, Esq. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/ejmittleman040703.htm [hereinafter 
Mittleman Letter]. 
 63. Letter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/skaddenarps1.htm. 
 64. Letter from Barrie Althoff, Att’y, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Dec. 17, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/balthoff1.htm. 
 65. Letter from the Comm. on Sec. of the Bus. Law Section of the Md. State Bar Ass’n to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s74502/adpoliakoff1.htm.  
 66. ACCA 2003 Letter, supra note 30. 
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with a reputation for caution and prudence”67 or avoiding “consulting 
counsel on close or controversial legal questions”;68 clients “turning to 
attorneys less often”;69 or, worse yet, “losing the attorney-client 
relationship entirely.”70 
Concern about self-preservation is exacerbated by competitive market 
conditions, actual or perceived, both within and outside of the legal 
profession. Intense competition among law firms has placed a premium on 
lawyers’ capacity to attract and retain clients, making it that much harder 
for lawyers to say no or to walk away on ethical grounds.71 With respect to 
the larger market of selling business advice to large corporations, 
competition from accountants, investment bankers, and management 
consultants drive lawyers to cling more tightly to their confidentiality 
guarantees—one competitive advantage that lawyers can tout to their 
clients.72 Also, fears of being displaced by the competition are magnified 
by the general anxiety about lawyers’ relative decline in social status as 
compared to other professionals, such as investment bankers or 
management consultants.73 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Letter from the Fed. Regulation Comm. of the Sec. Indus. Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, 
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/ 
frcsia040703.htm [hereinafter SIA Letter]. 
 68. Letter from Corp. Comm. Bus. Law Section, The State Bar of Cal. to Jonathan G. Katz, 
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tghoxiq1. 
htm. 
 69. Letter from The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 16 (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/300062186_4.pdf [hereinafter 
ABCNY 2003 Letter]; NYCLA Letter, supra note 60, at 16 (“[C]orporate officers or employees 
may not turn to lawyers for advice . . . .”). 
 70. Mittleman Letter, supra note 62. 
 71. See Kim, supra note 16, at 430–36; MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE 
FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 304–06 (2006). 
 72. See, e.g., Greg Billhartz, Can’t We All Just Get Along? Competing for Client 
Confidences: The Integration of the Accounting and Legal Professions, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 427, 445–47 (1998) (describing the role that confidentiality plays in the competitive jockeying 
between the legal and accounting professions); John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 
47 (“[T]he bar’s best consumer-oriented argument: While accountants may be cheaper and faster, 
they cannot offer broad-ranging confidentiality or loyalty to their clients and the protections those 
duties try to guarantee.”). To be sure, strictly speaking, pure business advice is not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, see, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1499–1500 (2d Cir. 
1995); although it may potentially be covered by the professional duty of confidentiality, which 
prohibits a lawyer from revealing any information “relating to the representation of a client” without 
the client’s consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2010).   
 73. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Confrontation Between the Big Five and Big 
Law: Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contests for Professional Credibility, 29 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 615, 635–36 (2004) (noting the relative decline in status of lawyers and the deeper threat 
posed by the accounting profession to the practice model of elite corporate law firms—a model that 
relies on noblesse oblige and recruitment from a higher socio-economic echelon); REGAN, supra 
note 71, at 319 (noting that investment bankers “enjoy greater power, prestige, and income than do 
lawyers”). 
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One example illustrates this point. Lawyers “reacted with dismay”74 
when in 1998 Congress recognized a qualified accountant-client privilege 
between clients and accountants who represent them in non-criminal tax 
proceedings before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and federal court 
(for suits brought by or against the United States).75 In fact, the ABA 
formally opposed the accountant-client privilege.76 ABA members 
considered the privilege to be the “latest encroachment by nonlawyers into 
activities that are best handled by attorneys.”77 They argued that the legal 
and accounting professions “cannot be treated congruously for purposes of 
privileged communications”78 and maintained that the limited privilege “is 
a dangerous first step down a slope that could lead to a blending of the two 
professions.”79  
Similar fears have been vocalized about the encroaching competition 
from large accounting firms80 that threatens to unify accounting and legal 
services under the single umbrella of multi-disciplinary partnerships 
(MDPs).81 In denouncing MDPs’ impingement on lawyers’ turf, lawyers 
have accused accountants of being too close to business and not 
sufficiently independent from client influence.82 This sounds like the pot 
calling the kettle black when lawyers overwhelmingly acknowledge that 
the practice of law is a business.83 Moreover, criticizing accountants for 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Who Is the 
Bar Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599, 625 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Bruce Balestier, Under One Roof: ABA Faces Arrival of Lawyer-Accountant Pairings, 
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1998, at 5). 
 75. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
112 Stat. 685 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1)–(2)(B) (2000)). Prior to the Act, communications 
between taxpayer and accountant were protected only when the accountant was hired by the 
taxpayer’s attorney. This privilege does not apply to written communications relating to the 
promotion of corporate tax shelters. 
 76. Confidentiality: IRS Reform Law Creates New Privilege Between Taxpayers and Tax 
Practitioners, 14 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 364 (1998), 
http://lawyersmanual.bna.com/mopw2/3300/split_display.adp?fedfid=442026&vname=mopcnotalli 
ssues&fcn=13&wsn=527350000&fn=442026&split=0 [hereinafter ABA/BNA, IRS Reform Law] 
(reporting that the ABA formally opposed the extension of the privilege to cover accountant-
taxpayer communications). 
 77. Lance J. Rogers, Unauthorized Practice: ABA President Creates Commission to Review 
Multidisciplinary Practice Issues, 14 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 390 (1998). 
 78. ABA/BNA, IRS Reform Law, supra note 76. 
 79. Id. (quoting comments from the president of the New York State Bar Association) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. See, e.g., Gibeaut, supra note 72, at 44 (noting that some lawyers view the threat from 
accounting firms as “a sort of Armageddon for the [legal] profession”). 
 81. See Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the Context of 
Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 909 (2002) (defining MDPs roughly as “professional 
service organizations offering legal services as part of a larger entity focused on business advice” 
and describing the various types).  
 82. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black Enron 
Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 548, 553–54 (2002); Garth & Silver, supra note 81, at 906–07.  
 83. See, e.g., Chris Klein, Big-Firm Partners: Profession Sinking, NAT’L L.J., May 26, 1997, 
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lacking independence from their clients sharply contradicts the bar’s 
repeated caricatures of accountants as independent “public watchdogs” 
during the debates over Sarbanes-Oxley § 307.84 
Of course, the bar would flatly reject the characterization that lawyers 
are motivated by raw self-interest. In opposing MDPs, for example, 
lawyers insist that they “are not engaged in turf protection.”85 Similarly, 
comments filed in connection with the SEC’s regulations implemented 
under Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 take great pains to avoid suggesting that the 
minimization of liability for lawyers is an end unto itself. Instead, the 
comments raise the specter of civil or administrative liability only insofar 
as it might compromise lawyers’ zeal on behalf of their clients.86 But social 
cognition research casts doubt on our ability to ascertain accurately our 
various motivations and suggests that it is tough, if not impossible, to 
identify and isolate the effect of self-interest on our own cognitions.87 
To provide a concrete example of the process by which various 
motivations, including self-interest, can warp our cognitions, recall your 
reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Bush v. Gore,88 which 
                                                                                                                     
at A1 (reporting that 82.7% of partners polled from the 125 biggest law firms believe that the 
profession has changed for the worse and “the law has become a fiercely dollar-driven business”).  
 84. See, e.g., NYCLA Letter, supra note 60 (“Accountants are the public’s watchdogs, 
attorneys are their client’s counselors.”); SIA Letter, supra note 67 (noting the Supreme Court’s 
statement that “an accountant serves a ‘public watchdog function’ and ‘owes ultimate allegiance to 
the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public’” (quoting United 
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984))); Letter from Latham & Watkins to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/latham1.htm (also noting that the Supreme Court has 
observed that “an accountant serves a ‘public watchdog function’”).  
 85. Unauthorized Practice: New York State Bar Creates Panel to Study Multi-Disciplinary 
Practice, 14 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 341 (1998) (quoting the president of 
the New York State Bar Association). 
 86. See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 26, at 33 (describing what effect third-party liability 
would have on lawyers’ incentives).  
 87. As Professors Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson argued in their seminal review article, 
we may have little or no introspective access to our higher-order cognitive processes, such as those 
involved in judgments, decision-making, and social behavior. Based on evidence from research on 
cognitive dissonance, attribution processes, problem solving, bystander intervention, and 
experiments specifically designed to test for this phenomenon, they suggest the following: when 
asked about whether a particular stimulus played a role in one’s decision or judgment, instead of 
retrieving a memory of our cognitive processes, we tend to recruit a culturally supplied a priori 
theory to explain the causal link between that stimulus and our response. Richard E. Nisbett & 
Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 
84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231–32 (1977); Timothy DeCamp Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The 
Accuracy of Verbal Reports About the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 118, 118 (1978). Professor Ziva Kunda described Nisbett and Wilson’s 1977 article as 
“highly influential.” ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 268 (1999). 
Professors Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor noted that “there is a substantial amount of anecdotal 
evidence from psychological studies” to support Nisbett and Wilson’s hypotheses. FISKE & TAYLOR, 
supra note 40, at 198. 
 88. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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effectively decided who would be the U.S. president in 2000. If you voted 
for Albert Gore, you probably viewed the five-Justice majority opinion as a 
“travesty of constitutional law”89 and were astonished by how those 
Justices adopted whatever legal arguments would guarantee George Bush’s 
crowning.90 Indeed, 673 law professors felt the need to write so publicly.91 
Or, if you voted for Bush, you probably applauded the Supreme Court for 
reigning in an errant and activist Florida Supreme Court that had violated 
federal constitutional principles in its handling of the presidential 
election.92  
I’m uninterested in who was “right” in some substantive moral or legal 
sense. Far more intriguing is that each side in this partisan battle sincerely 
believed that only the other was acting disingenuously and 
opportunistically.93 How can two groups of people look at the same set of 
facts and come to opposite conclusions?94 This question, which may be 
intriguing to law readers, produces something like a collective yawn from 
psychologists and behavioral economists. Decades of research demonstrate 
that both sides were simply motivated to do so.95 
There are so many representative studies to proffer that it’s hard to 
choose. Here are three. In one classic field study, a film of a particularly 
raucous Princeton-Dartmouth football game was shown to students of both 
universities.96 Although both groups viewed the same game, each side 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The 
Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 613–14 (2001) (describing how 
liberals viewed the Bush v. Gore decision). 
 90. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE 
L.J. 1407, 1408–09 (2001) (suggesting that Bush v. Gore appeared to be motivated by the “‘low’ 
politics of partisan political advantage”). 
 91. See The Rule of Law, http://www.the-rule-of-law.com/archive/supreme/ (last visited Oct. 
14, 2010). 
 92. Epstein, supra note 89, at 614 (defending the concurring opinion based on Article II, § 1, 
Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution); see also Jonathan K. Van Patten, Making Sense of Bush v. Gore, 
47 S.D. L. REV. 32, 32 & n.† (2002) (defending Bush v. Gore and disclosing that the author is 
Republican and voted for George W. Bush). 
 93. In fact, on almost every aspect of the Bush/Gore presidential election, the public was 
divided on the issues, and those views highly correlated with political affiliation. For example, 94% 
of Bush supporters thought the Supreme Court’s ruling was fair and justifiable while only 17% of 
Gore supporters did. Sixty-six percent of Gore supporters thought that the Justices were influenced 
by their “personal political views” while 31% of Bush supporters did. See Ehrlinger et al., supra 
note 39, at 680 (reporting 2000 Gallup Poll results). 
 94. For an exploration of this phenomenon in the context of allegations of discrimination, see 
Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2008). 
 95. To be sure, motivated reasoning is not the only possible explanation for divergent 
inferences and conclusions from the same stimuli. Indeed, any inherently ambiguous stimulus will 
generate multiple interpretations even without motivation. That said, if a particular set of inferences 
seems to align perfectly with perceived economic self-interest, it’s hard to claim that self-interested 
motivation isn’t a driver. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 170–76 (2005) 
(describing how we interpret inherently ambiguous stimuli). 
 96. Albert Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). It should be noted that studies that illustrate the mechanism of 
motivated reasoning are also illustrative of more specific cognitive biases, e.g., confirmation bias 
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essentially witnessed two different games. “The Princeton fans saw a 
continuing saga of Dartmouth atrocities and occasional Princeton 
retaliations. The Dartmouth fans saw brutal Princeton provocations and 
occasional measured Dartmouth responses.”97 Each side saw “a game in 
which their team was the ‘good guys’ and the other team was the ‘bad 
guys.’”98  
In another study, subjects with views on both sides of the capital 
punishment debate were presented with randomly selected but mixed 
evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty.99 After reviewing the 
same mixed bag of evidence, each side became more polarized: subjects 
tended to uncritically accept evidence supporting their own positions while 
critically discounting equally probative evidence that ran counter to their 
positions.100 And greater expertise doesn’t seem to eliminate the power of 
motivation: in subsequent studies, established scientists and scientists in 
training displayed this same tendency.101  
Finally, in yet another study, subjects were presented with identical 
litigation materials abstracted from an actual lawsuit involving a 
motorcycle-car collision.102 When asked to predict how much the judge 
would award the plaintiff if negotiations stalled, subjects randomly 
assigned to play the plaintiff predicted that they would receive much larger 
awards than the amounts predicted by subjects randomly assigned to play 
defendant.103 Moreover, each side tended to recall more informational 
details that supported its position.104 
These studies are among the many cited to support the existence of 
“motivated reasoning.”105 Motivation, or any desire or preference for a 
                                                                                                                     
and self-serving bias. 
 97. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 72 (1991) (describing the Hastorf and Cantril study). 
 98. Leigh Thompson, “They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship and Involvement, 68 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839, 840 (1995) (describing the Hastorf and Cantril study). 
 99. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2100 (1979); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A 
Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 
(1996). 
 100. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 97, at 72–73. 
 101. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of 
Evidence Quality, in 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 28, 28–55 
(1993).  
 102. See Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1337, 1338 (1995); Kim, supra note 41, at 1029. 
 103. Kim, supra note 41, at 1029.  
 104. Thompson, supra note 98, at 840. 
 105. KUNDA, supra note 87, at 211 (noting the “emerging consensus that motivation and affect 
can and do affect judgment” and citing sources therein). For other examples of motivated reasoning, 
see Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria 
for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 568–84 
(1992) (describing three different experiments involving the preferred and non-preferred 
conclusions of cognitive processes); Lee Sigelman & Carol K. Sigelman, Judgments of the Carter-
Reagan Debate: The Eye of the Beholders, 48 PUB. OPINION Q. 624–28 (1984) (describing “the 
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particular outcome, will affect our reasoning through “reliance on a biased 
set of cognitive processes” that are involved in “forming impressions, 
determining one’s beliefs and attitudes, evaluating evidence, and making 
decisions.”106 When engaged in reasoning tasks, instead of relying on all 
available knowledge, we tend to selectively access a subset of beliefs, 
knowledge constructs, inferential rules, and facts residing in our memories 
to support our favored conclusions.107  
What all of this suggests is that your views about whether the 2000 
presidential election was wrongly or rightly decided by the Supreme Court 
were shaped by your motivation, i.e., your desire for your candidate to win. 
It should also come as no surprise, then, that—in the context of the debates 
over gatekeeping—lawyers will rely on cognitive processes that are already 
skewed toward an outcome in line with their pre-existing views. And, 
given the omnipresent tendency to favor that which economically benefits 
oneself, those pre-existing views are likely to be in sync with lawyers’ self-
interest. Moreover, as the death penalty studies predict, when faced with 
strong counter-arguments, lawyers (like everyone else) are likely to dig in 
their heels rather than moderate their views. 
I don’t want to overstate my point. The fact that the motivation of self-
interest can distort or color our judgments does not mean that we are free 
to conclude whatever we want simply because we want to.108 Even some 
conservative legal scholars who defended the result in Bush v. Gore could 
not bring themselves to endorse the particular equal protection rationale 
advanced by the majority.109 (The same might be said of progressive legal 
scholars who liked the result in Roe v. Wade but not its reasoning.) While 
the selective search for reasons to bolster our argument may be deeply 
flawed and partisan, our ability to justify our desired conclusions is 
nonetheless constrained, for example, by our understanding of reality as 
constructed by prior knowledge and plausibility.110 
In sum, lawyers, like everyone else, are generally motivated to espouse 
positions that favor their perceived self-interest. But this generally happens 
not through any overt or explicit cost-benefit calculation “but through a 
subtle and implicit reconfiguration of preferences, self-conception, and 
motivation.”111 In fighting against regulation, lawyers subjectively see 
themselves as not arguing (principally) about the money. My point is that 
even though they may be sincere in this self-understanding, they may still 
                                                                                                                     
impact of prior cognition and affect on judgments of the outcome of the 1980 Carter-Reagan 
debate”).  
 106. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990). 
 107. Id. at 483; see also GILBERT, supra note 95, at 176–87. 
 108. KUNDA, supra note 87, at 224. 
 109. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 89, at 614 (describing the court’s holding on equal 
protection grounds as a “confused nonstarter at best” and endorsing the “more potent” argument 
that the rulings of the Florida Supreme Court “ran afoul of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution, which provides that ‘Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
Thereof May Direct,’” the state’s electors). 
 110. KUNDA, supra note 87, at 224–32. 
 111. Kim, supra note 41, at 997. 
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be arguing (principally though not exclusively) about the money. So, to the 
exasperated cynic’s claim that “It’s about the money, stupid!” we can all 
agree on the one hand. On the other hand, it’s much more subtle and 
complex than that.  
III.  INTERNALIZING MANAGERS’ INTEREST 
Why do lawyers resist gatekeeping? Not only is it in lawyers’ economic 
self-interest (as processed through motivated reasoning), but it is also in 
the self-interest of those senior corporate managers who are vested with the 
authority to define corporate objectives and instruct lawyers on how to 
meet them. It should not surprise us that most managers (regardless of 
whether or not they are orchestrating corporate frauds) dislike even the 
suggestion that a lawyer might go over their heads to snitch on them.112 
Sociologists have amply documented that corporate managers are generally 
hostile to regulation: they overwhelmingly espouse laissez-faire economic 
policies and see regulation as a threat to their autonomy.113 And, quite 
understandably, few managers will elect to be morally hectored by their 
lawyer—only to be billed $400 per hour for the enlightenment. Predictably, 
the comment letters from the Business Roundtable and the Securities 
Industry Association reflect business’s aversion to regulatory meddling 
into managerial prerogatives.114 
What’s more interesting is why lawyers would adopt managerial anti-
regulatory preferences on the issue of lawyer gatekeeping as their own. Of 
course, as suggested above, in the gatekeeping context, managers’ views 
happen to correspond with lawyers’ perceived economic self-interest. But 
that captures only part of the story. It fails to adequately explain the 
empirical finding that, on certain matters, most lawyers adopt managers’ 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 322. 
 113. See, e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 4 
(1988); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 1 (1979); Robert 
W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 278 (1990) (citing 
studies); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and 
Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 515 (1985) (referring to this 
finding and citing studies); Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the 
Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343, 373–77 
(1981) (citing studies).  
 114. See Letter from the Bus. Roundtable to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/brt040803.htm (arguing that either noisy 
withdrawal proposal “would undermine the relationship between attorneys and their organizational 
clients and deter officers, directors and employees from seeking advice from counsel on sensitive 
matters”); SIA Letter, supra note 67 (arguing that “the [reporting out] rule will make it extremely 
common for corporate officials to shy away from seeking legal advice, or to trim what they tell their 
lawyers”); id. (expressing opposition (1) to requiring lawyers to “independently review the business 
judgment” of the issuer’s audit committee or board of directors and (2) to allowing the subordinate 
in-house attorney to report evidence of material violation directly to the CEO or QLCC (and thus 
bypassing her supervisory attorney) unless special circumstances dictate otherwise). 
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positions even when doing so is against their own self-interest.115 It also 
ignores the extended process of acculturation that lawyers undergo to 
arrive at their currently held positions and attitudes. Thus, a more 
comprehensive explanation for why lawyers resist gatekeeping must 
account for the psychological mechanisms by which lawyers come to adopt 
the views of corporate managers, independent of lawyers’ perceived self-
interest.  
The well-known and widely documented theory of cognitive dissonance 
helps provide such an explanation. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts 
that when a person’s behavior is inconsistent with her prior self-image or 
attitudes to such a degree that dissonance or “psychic unrest” is aroused,116 
her internal attitudes will shift to generate greater alignment with her 
behavior in an effort to reduce the dissonance.117   
Here’s one representative study involving an experimenter asking 
subjects to eat fried grasshoppers.118 In the first group, an intentionally 
pleasant experimenter did the asking; in the second group, an intentionally 
unpleasant experimenter did.119 About half of the subjects in both 
conditions agreed to eat a grasshopper.120 While both groups of subjects 
initially held similar negative attitudes about eating grasshoppers,121 only 
                                                                                                                     
 115. See infra notes 143–55 and accompanying text. 
 116. Dissonance is aroused if the “expected outcome of behaving inconsistently with one’s 
attitude is an event that one would rather not have occur.” PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. 
LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 114 (1991) (internal 
quotation marks and external source omitted); see Joel Cooper & Russell H. Fazio, A New Look at 
Dissonance Theory, in 17 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 229, 229–30 (Leonard 
Berkowitz ed., 1984). 
 117. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–3 (1957); ZIMBARDO & 
LEIPPE, supra note 116, at 107–23; Kim, supra note 41, at 1011. Stated in motivational terms, 
“people are motivated to adopt the attitude they had been led to express, and it is this motivation 
that provokes attitude change.” KUNDA, supra note 87, at 217. For discussions of cognitive 
dissonance theory as pertaining to lawyers, see, for example, David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes 
and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 279–80 (2003); Gordon, supra note 44, at 57. 
Cognitive dissonance scholars argue that these attitude shifts are motivated by the need to attain 
some degree of consistency and equilibrium for purposes of organizing and acting upon vast stores 
of information in a way that economizes cognitive effort. See Dan Simon & Keith J. Holyoak, 
Structural Dynamics of Cognition: From Consistency Theories to Constraint Satisfaction, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 283, 284–85 (2002). 
 118. ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 116, at 116; Philip G. Zimbardo et al., Communicator 
Effectiveness in Producing Public Conformity and Private Attitude Change, 33 J. PERSONALITY 
233, 236 (1965). 
 119. The positive experimenter was rated high on being “calm, courteous, mature, clear-
thinking,” and “neither tactless nor hostile to others.” The negative experimenter was evaluated as 
“not a warm person, is primarily bossy, tactless, demanding, snobbish, not genuinely interested in 
the subject, egotistical, and somewhat insincere and not very calm.” Id. at 251–52. In both groups, 
all subjects reported having the freedom to choose whether or not to eat them and that the 
experimenter did not exert much in the way of “direct pressure.” Id. at 242. 
 120. Id. at 241. Thus, “public conformity was unrelated to communicator differences.” Id. at 
254. 
 121. Id. at 246 (noting no differences in initial attitude positions between communicator 
conditions). This disparity also held even under incentive conditions. Id. at 247. 
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the subjects in the second group (unpleasant experimenter condition) 
overwhelmingly reported liking the taste of grasshoppers after trying 
them.122 As the authors of the study explained, for those subjects whose 
attitudes changed, the pretext of yielding to the request of an affable 
experimenter (“How could I refuse such a nice fellow?”) was plainly not 
available.123 Given their inability to disclaim ownership for their behavior 
that conflicted with their prior attitudes,124 their only plausible recourse 
was to convince themselves that grasshoppers were quite palatable after all. 
Stated another way, the psychic discomfort that naturally arose while 
engaged in counter-attitudinal behavior (munching on grasshoppers) was 
diminished when subjects unconsciously took the path of least resistance 
and changed their internal attitudes to move in line with their behavior.  
Just as interesting, the change in attitudes had behavioral implications. 
After eating the grasshoppers and filling out the post-experimental attitude 
questionnaires, subjects were then asked to consent to being identified in 
army survival training manuals as persons who had tried grasshoppers and 
liked them.125 A far greater percentage of subjects in the unpleasant 
experimenter group gave strong endorsements of grasshoppers than those 
in the pleasant experimenter group.126  
This grasshopper study is meant simply to convey the gist of a 
phenomenon that has been extensively studied and verified.  Extrapolating 
such findings to the lawyer-client relationship, we can predict that 
experienced lawyers who have long and dutifully performed the directives 
of their client representatives will have re-aligned their attitudes to match 
the views of their clients to achieve greater consistency between their 
actions and attitudes. 
At this point, one could object that lawyers should experience no 
attitude change because lawyers can point to their hefty fees as the obvious 
explanation behind their actions. But people—even lawyers—do not like to 
think of themselves as bought and paid for127 and thus will resist the 
insinuation that they are doing it just for the money. Indeed, experiments 
testing cognitive dissonance theory reveal that attitude shifts are more 
likely with larger monetary payments (as compared to smaller monetary 
payments) if such larger payments could plausibly be interpreted as 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 245 (noting that the negative communicator is much more effective in changing 
attitudes in the desired direction (55%) than the positive communicator (5%)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Barry R. Schlenker et al., Self-Presentational Analysis of the Effects of Incentives on 
Attitude Change Following Counterattitudinal Behavior, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 553, 
555 (1980) (noting that numerous studies have found that subjects must appear to be responsible in 
order for attitude change to occur following counter-attitudinal behavior and citing studies). 
 125. Zimbardo et al., supra note 118, at 247–48. 
 126. Thirty-seven percent in the negative communicator condition gave strong endorsements 
while only 11% did so in the positive condition. Id. at 248. 
 127. See, e.g., AMER. BAR ASS’N, “. . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR 
REKINDLING LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 30 (1986) (complaining that “too many practitioners have 
‘sold out to the client’” and advocating that “the duty to the system of justice must transcend the 
duty to the client”). 
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bribes.128 So long as individuals are able to perceive that they have freely 
chosen their behavior, as opposed to having succumbed to outside 
pressure, internal attitude shifts are likely.129 
Moreover, at least two other factors should militate in favor of attitude 
shifts. First, internal attitudes are more likely to shift toward the position 
implied by the behavior if that behavior consists of role-playing. Research 
on role-playing suggests that when people actively adopt another’s 
persona, they are more likely to come to identify and empathize with that 
person’s perspective.130 For example, when college students were asked to 
actively construct arguments in favor of the military draft for college 
students, they came to adopt those views, more so than students who had 
merely heard or recited those same arguments.131 In another seminal study, 
heavy smokers who adopted and acted out the role of someone who was 
receiving a diagnosis of lung cancer ended up expressing stronger beliefs 
that smoking causes lung cancer as compared to a control group of heavy 
smokers who merely listened to recordings of the active role-playing 
sessions.132 Moreover, the role-players subsequently reported smoking on 
average 10.5 fewer cigarettes per day than the control subjects. 
Remarkably, this difference persisted until a follow-up study conducted six 
months later.133 In short, active role-playing is more likely to generate 
internal attitude shifts than mere passive exposure to information. 
To a large degree, lawyers engage in role-playing when doing their 
clients’ bidding. Although many lawyers don’t formally advocate in court 
on behalf of their clients, they do write letters, file forms, negotiate, sign 
documents, make telephone calls, meet counterparties and regulatory 
authorities, and lobby (often against proposed regulation) on behalf of their 
clients. Unlike the surgeon or plumber, the lawyer “act[s] in the place of 
the client, [which] require[s] the direct involvement of the lawyer’s moral 
faculties—i.e., his capacities to deliberate, reason, argue and act in the 
public arena.”134 The lawyer must, at least to a degree, channel the client’s 
values and preferences when acting as the client’s voice-box. In effect, the 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Schlenker et al., supra note 124, at 568–71 (finding that when payment is introduced in a 
context that increases subject’s concerns about moral evaluations relevant to bribery, a direct 
relationship occurred between magnitude of payment and attitude change).  
 129. ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 116, at 111–13; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said 
than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 771, 803–04 (2007). 
 130. ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 116, at 102. 
 131. See Irving L. Janis & Bert T. King, The Influence of Role Playing on Opinion Change, 49 
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211–18 (1954); Bert T. King & Irving L. Janis, Comparison of the 
Effectiveness of Improvised Versus Non-Improvised Role-Playing in Producing Opinion Changes, 9 
HUM. REL. 177–86 (1956).  
 132. Irving L. Janis & Leon Mann, Effectiveness of Emotional Role-Playing in Modifying 
Smoking Habits and Attitudes, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL RES. PERSONALITY, 84–90 (1965). 
 133. Leon Mann & Irving L. Janis, A Follow-Up Study on the Long-Term Effects of Emotional 
Role Playing, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 339, 341 (1968). 
 134. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 76 
(1980); see also Kim, supra note 41, at 1011. 
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lawyer becomes “an extension of the legal, and to an extent the moral, 
personality of the client.”135 Consistently role-playing on behalf of the 
client may lead to the integration of some of the client’s views into the 
lawyer’s enduring belief structures.136  
Second, internal attitudes are more likely to shift when the counter-
attitudinal behavior is highly public.137 People “tend to feel obliged to 
stand by their public deeds.”138 This is in part due to people’s “self-
presentational” concerns—our general need to establish, maintain, and 
refine a favorable image of ourselves before real or imagined audiences.139 
The fear of being labeled a “hypocrite,” “liar,” “two-faced,” or a “fool”140 
may generate the type of psychic unrest that is ultimately responsible for 
causing attitude change.141 Moreover, since public behaviors are more 
verifiable by third parties, they “cannot easily be denied or distorted in the 
person’s mind.”142  By contrast, a person’s attitudes or beliefs are relatively 
malleable, unstable constructs. 
When lawyers represent their clients, they often do so in the public 
arena. Whether lawyers are transacting business or litigating, they are 
frequently acting as the client’s intermediary to counterparties, courts, 
government agencies, or other third parties. Accordingly, those public 
behaviors cannot easily be dismissed as mere aberrations or explained 
away with other justifications. Bereft of other plausible explanations for 
engaging in such public behaviors, lawyers’ views will move in line with 
clients’ views. 
To be clear, to predict that lawyers’ attitudes will move toward those of 
their clients’ managers does not mean that lawyers will automatically 
become champions of their clients’ political causes or become card-
carrying members of the American Chamber of Commerce. As suggested 
by Professor Robert Gordon, the more common response may be to 
“withdraw into technique, into the professional cult of craftsmanship and 
competence for its own sake, or just into the cynicism that seems to be our 
profession’s main defense mechanism.”143 But even adopting that (weaker) 
attitude would be more consistent with what most corporate managers view 
as the proper passive role of corporate lawyers.144 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Postema, supra note 134, at 77.  
 136. ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 116, at 115–16 (citing studies). 
 137. Id. at 115. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Roy F. Baumeister, A Self-Presentational View of Social Phenomena, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
3 (1982). This motivation need not be a consciously experienced one; nor does one’s public image 
need to be accurate in an objective sense. Id. 
 140. See id. at 11. 
 141. Id. at 11–14 (citing studies). 
 142. ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 116, at 115–16. 
 143. Gordon, supra note 44, at 57. 
 144. The prevailing managerial view is that, even on matters entailing tremendous legal risks, 
lawyers are there to assess legal risk and implement decisions made by senior corporate managers. 
See Robert Eli Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. 
L. REV. 1157, 1169, 1172 (2003); Kim, supra note 41, at 1017. To be sure, client representatives 
who do want lawyers to be their corporations’ consciences do exist. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 
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Sociological evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that large firm 
lawyers have internalized the views of their client representatives. 
Professor Robert Nelson’s 1985 study of 224 lawyers in four large Chicago 
law firms145 is telling. Nelson found that although corporate lawyers were 
politically more liberal on general social issues than the business clients 
that they represented,146 most lawyers displayed strong identification with 
managerial interests on issues relating to their law practice. When asked to 
“play king” and explain “what they would change about the law that they 
practice if they had the necessary legislative and judicial power,”147 
lawyers tended to support proposals that would benefit their clients.148 
They favored changes that benefited management over organized labor, 
lending institutions over consumer-borrowers, wealthy taxpayers,149 and 
antitrust and litigation defense.150 Lawyers came out against government 
regulation in the fields in which they practice, favoring the reduction of 
government power, especially the power of the IRS and the SEC.151 
Recently published sociological research on 787 members of the Chicago 
bar152 confirms Nelson’s findings that corporate lawyers are considerably 
more supportive of corporate power than the general population—in spite 
of otherwise generally liberal political leanings.153 As summed up by 
Nelson, “[g]iven an unconstrained power to change the law, the majority 
[of lawyers] would change the law to suit the interests of their clients.”154 
                                                                                                                     
44, at 25 (citing sources).  
 145. Nelson, supra note 113, at 509. The findings of the study have also been reported in 
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 
31–32 (1988) (discussing methodology). 
 146. Nelson, supra note 113, at 515 (reporting data on attitudes about the government’s role in 
policing the marketplace and concluding, based on the data, that “[B]usinessmen are substantially 
more optimistic about the capacity of the market than are the legal elites who represent them.”). For 
example, when soliciting responses to the statement, “The protection of consumer interests is best 
insured by a vigorous competition among sellers rather than by federal government intervention,” 
lawyers were split equally between agreeing and disagreeing with this statement (43.3% agreed, 
43.3% disagreed). Id. By contrast, in a separate study referred to by Nelson, when businessmen 
were asked a similar question, 74% or three-quarters, had more faith in competition than regulation. 
See NELSON, supra note 145, at 238–39. 
 147. Nelson, supra note 113, at 521. 
 148. NELSON, supra note 145, at 247 (“In all, 80.2 percent of the responses suggested that the 
proposed changes would have salutary effects for clients.”). By contrast, slightly more than “6 
percent of the proposals favored liberal social issues, increased access to the courts, or support for 
legal services to the poor.” Id. at 247. 
 149. Nelson, supra note 113, at 522, 524 (reporting finding that lawyers favored reducing 
taxes, especially estate and capital gains taxes). 
 150. Id. at 524–25. 
 151. Id. at 524. 
 152. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 19 
(2005). 
 153. Id. at 200 (noting that, “[B]y 1995 the percentage of the public that was critical of the 
power of large companies was more than twice the percentage among the lawyers.”). In other 
words, lawyers were less than half as likely as the general public to be critical of corporate power. 
 154. Nelson, supra note 113, at 525. 
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There is one particularly interesting finding in Nelson’s 1985 study. 
Lawyers broadly acknowledged that the deregulatory reforms that they 
desired would have, at least in the short-run, an adverse impact on their 
practices. Only 6% of lawyers believed that their work would expand while 
two-thirds believed that there would either be little to no effect or their 
work might even be substantially reduced.155 As Nelson concluded, “The 
results show such a strong identification with the interests of clients—even 
to the point of putting clients’ long-term interests above [lawyers’] short-
term [financial] interests.”156 Again, the self-interest story is more 
complicated. To be sure, clear and indisputable evidence of lawyers acting 
counter to their own economic self-interest is hard to find.157 But the 
existence of a few such examples is tough to reconcile with any 
Procrustean view that economic self-interest, simplistically conceived, is 
the exclusive and all-encompassing force shaping lawyers’ views.  
Turning to the bar’s reaction to post-Enron calls for reform, we see 
evidence of lawyers internalizing managers’ views in statements 
expressing solicitude for potentially misbehaving managers. Although a 
potential material law violation is a serious issue for any public 
corporation, voices from the bar minimize the graveness of the matter. For 
example, a leading member of the organized ethics bar describes a serious 
law violation as a mere “lapse”158 in judgment and describes the managers 
committing malfeasance as people who simply “do not do the ‘right 
thing.’”159 We are warned that these managers will be “judged with the 
benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight.”160 Commentators sometimes frame the 
failure to rectify a material law violation as management’s prerogative: it is 
simply the client’s choice “not to follow the lawyer’s advice,”161 or a mere 
“difference of opinion”162 with the lawyer, or an “honest disagreement with 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 526 (noting that one-third perceived no great consequences and one-third thought 
the reforms might substantially reduce their work). Also, the response that was twice as common as 
all others was that the proposed reforms will lower client legal costs. See NELSON, supra note 145, 
at 247. 
 156. Nelson, supra note 113, at 526–27. 
 157. See Gordon, supra note 113, at 274 (noting a few historical examples in which lawyers 
pushed for reforms that ran counter to their clients’ interests but acknowledging that such 
occurrences are rare and “that most lawyers’ policy groups seek only to minimize both clients’ and 
lawyers’ exposure to regulation and liability”). 
 158. Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout From Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of 
Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1243, 1246, 1255 (“[W]e really would not need regulators anymore, because each client’s 
lawyer . . . not only has the obligation to make sure that the client conforms to the law, but also is 
liable, along with the client, when the client lapses.” And “lawyers will be hired to be on 
watch, . . . ready to sound the clarion call when the client should lapse.” (emphasis added)). 
 159. Id. at 1246. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. ABCNY 2002 Letter, supra note 24, at 10 (“Reasonable people, even prudent attorneys, 
can differ in drawing the conclusion that an officer or employee has breached a duty or broken a 
law. That difference of opinion cannot be turned into a basis for disciplinary sanction.”). 
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that counsel.”163 The implication, of course, is that managers are entitled to 
break the law. Consistent with this outlook, calls for reforming lawyer 
conduct are seen as a tremendous overreaction to a marginal problem—the 
senior manager’s mere “difference of opinion.” 
By contrast, the bar portrays hypothetical lawyers who demand the 
rectification of law violations as contemptuous. They are seen as “over-
anxious,”164 as “cry[ing] wolf” to chief legal officers,165 acting in an 
“imprudent and uninformed manner,”166 and making “mountains” out of 
“mole hills.”167 Commentators fear and envision the scenario where the 
manager will be forced “to acquiesce in following the lawyer’s advice even 
when in good faith [he] strongly disagrees with the advice and the advice 
may be wrong or highly debatable.”168  
Of course, lawyers crying wolf is a possibility in any regulatory regime. 
After all, no matter what rule one chooses, there will always be a risk that 
some lawyers will err in their interpretation of the rule or that the rule, as 
applied, will catch or chill innocent conduct. But this argument begs the 
question: as between the lawyer and the non-lawyer, who better to 
determine whether the law has been violated? Presumably, lawyers, by 
virtue of their education and training, have superior expertise in identifying 
most law violations.169 And, among the various gatekeeping professionals, 
lawyers are most qualified “to advise on what would satisfy the purpose 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Letter from 79 Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 7, 
2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/79lawfirms1.htm (“Significantly, clients will 
understand the potential adverse consequences of consulting counsel and thereafter having an 
honest disagreement with that counsel.”). 
 164. ABCNY 2003 Letter, supra note 69, at 19 (“In fact, if numerous public disclosures turn 
out to be the result of nothing more than over-anxious lawyers allowing their conservatism to result 
in disagreements with clients resulting in public disclosure, clients as a whole will become more 
and more leery of working with, or disclosing information to, cautious counsel and the risk of 
failures to comply with laws will only increase.”). 
 165. Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s74502/sullivan040703.htm (“The rule thus effectively requires counsel to ‘cry wolf’ to chief legal 
officers.”). 
 166. Id. (“Investors will not be well served by a hair-trigger reporting requirement that forces a 
prudent and honest attorney to act in an imprudent and uninformed manner.”). 
 167. ABCNY 2003 Letter, supra note 69, at 19 (“[I]f reporting out becomes relatively 
common and a number of cases prove to be the result of ‘mole hills’ built into ‘mountains’ by 
attorneys engaged in defensive thinking due to their fear of being second-guessed by the 
Commission, investors may actually become immune to an attorney’s notice of withdrawal.”). 
 168. Law Firms Letter, supra note 27 (“The threat of withdrawal thus may effectively force a 
client to acquiesce in following the lawyer’s advice even when in good faith it strongly disagrees 
with the advice and the advice may even be wrong or highly debatable.”). 
 169. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1293, 1306 (2003). To be sure, lawyers are not necessarily the most adept at identifying law 
violations that are classifiable as “pure accounting frauds.” That said, many frauds—even the 
elaborate ones concocted by Enron managers—are not “pure accounting frauds” and require the 
substantial assistance (witting or unwitting) of lawyers. See Regan, supra note 12, for a detailed 
account of what roles lawyers played in the Enron transactions. 
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and spirit, as well as letter, of the law.”170 From this perspective, it is 
strange to exempt from gatekeeping those professionals who are 
presumably most adept at determining law violations.171 
In addition, the bar’s overwhelming emphasis on the risks of over-
inclusion (i.e., the risk of frequent “false alarms”) assumes the empirical 
proposition that risk-averse lawyers will be prone to ratting out their client 
representatives. But, as I have argued elsewhere,172 the fear should be just 
the opposite. By virtue of the nature of the lawyer-client relationship in the 
corporate context, lawyers will remain subject to enormous pressures to 
overlook management wrongdoing, notwithstanding their gatekeeping 
obligations.173 Moreover, the theoretical fear of rampant whistle-blowing is 
undercut by the real-world experience of auditors. Since the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, auditors have been statutorily 
obligated to report to the SEC any unrectified material illegalities 
encountered in the course of their work for public company clients.174 The 
evidence strongly indicates that auditors remain deeply reluctant to make 
such reports.175 The bar’s selective emphasis on only one set of risks—the 
risk of over-inclusion—reflects just how strongly lawyers have adopted 
managers’ points of view. 
IV.  IGNORING SHAREHOLDERS’ INTEREST 
Again, why do lawyers resist gatekeeping? After all, doctors are 
required by state law to notify state welfare authorities when they see 
evidence of child abuse. They did not campaign against such obligations in 
the name of confidentiality or alignment with parental interests. Assuming 
that lawyers are generally not sociopaths, they too should care about the 
harms caused by their actions (or knowing inaction) to innocent third 
parties. If it is too much to ask lawyers for corporations to worry about 
harms suffered by innocent people who die of chemical leaks in Third 
World countries,176 at least they should be concerned about formally 
recognized constituents of the corporation, to wit: shareholders. As a 
general matter, plausible material law violations committed by managers 
do endanger shareholder interests. Shouldn’t lawyers care about 
shareholders’ interests? Especially if they regard themselves (as the law 
does) as fiduciaries of their corporate clients? 
Take, for example, the following text from the official comment of the 
law firm of Jones Day: 
                                                                                                                     
 170. Rhode, supra note 47, at 1331. 
 171. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Kim, supra note 41, at 1075. 
 173. See id.; Kim, supra note 16, at 430–46. 
 174. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1) (2006); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
291, § 10A(b), 48 Stat. 881 (as amended in 1995, 2002 & 2010). 
 175. See Coffee, supra note 169, at 1306 (citing sources showing extremely low auditor report 
rates for both immaterial and material illegalities covered by the reporting obligation). 
 176. See, e.g., Eric A. Lustig, The Bhopal Disaster Approaches 25: Looking Back to Look 
Forward, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 671, 671–75 (2008) (introducing symposium issue on Bhopal). 
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In a corporate setting, under the ABA Rules[, the attorney’s] 
client is the corporation. Attorneys are advocates. The 
touchstone of the attorney’s professional and ethical 
obligation is the attorney’s duty to the client, not some 
undefined duty to “the market” or “public investors,” and 
especially not to the government agency that, among other 
roles, can bring an enforcement proceeding against the 
client.177  
The above disclaimer of the relevance of shareholder (and other) 
interests is repeated in a number of comment letters.178 To be sure, the 
above statement is a technically accurate restatement of the law governing 
lawyers. A lawyer’s fiduciary duty is owed to the organization alone, and 
not to any of its individual constituents.179 Accordingly, when substantial 
harm to the organization is threatened by constituent wrongdoing, the 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Letter from Jones Day to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm. (Apr. 7, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jonesday040703b.htm (emphasis added). 
 178. See, e.g., Letter from Clifford Chance to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm. 
(Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/clifford1.htm (“We do not believe, 
however, that a lawyer for a company has an obligation to investors or potential investors in that 
company, including individual shareholders.”); Letter from Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm. (Jan. 6, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s74502/munger010603.htm [hereinafter Munger, Tolles, & Olson Letter] 
(“[S]hareholders are no more the client than are officers or directors.”); Letter from L.A. Cnty. Bar 
Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm. (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s74502/maroni1.htm [hereinafter LACBA Letter] (“We believe that the fiduciary duties of 
an attorney for an entity are owed to the entity itself, not separately to the shareholders.”); Letter 
from Corp. Comm., Bus. Law Section, The State Bar of Cal. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm. (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tghoxiq1.htm (“[A]n 
attorney who represents a corporation represents the entity, but does not thereby also represent the 
shareholders.”); ABA Letter, supra note 26, at 9 (“The Commission . . . correctly characterizes the 
organization, and not its shareholders or other constituencies, as the client. This distinction is 
important in identifying to whom a lawyer owes duties–namely the organization and not particular 
shareholders, whose interests may differ.” (emphasis added)); ABCNY 2002 Letter, supra note 24, 
at 46 (“The Commission Should Clarify That Attorneys Subject To The Proposed Rule Owe A Duty 
Solely To Their Client, The Corporate Entity, And Not To Investors, And Should Modify The 
Language In The Proposed Rules To Clarify That There Is No Private Right Of Action For 
Violation Of The Proposed Rule.” (formatting modified)). 
 179. For authority on the identity of the client in the organizational context, see MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) & cmt. 1 (2010) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized 
constituents. . . . Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the 
corporate organizational client.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5–18 (1980) (“A 
lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and 
not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the 
entity.”); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 448 F.2d 1175, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 2 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (2000) (“By representing the 
organization, a lawyer does not thereby also form a client–lawyer relationship with all or any 
individuals employed by it or who direct its operations . . . .”). 
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lawyer must proceed in the best interests of the organization.180 
But, as a practical matter, one cannot assess the harm to the 
organization without considering the violation’s impact on the company’s 
share price, which determines whether the company can reasonably obtain 
public financing in the future. And plausible cases of material law 
violations under Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 are likely to negatively impact 
share price.181 Of course, considering the company’s share price 
necessarily implicates shareholder interests.  
My goal here is not to wade into the contentious normative debate 
about the primacy of shareholders, directors, or managers in the corporate 
governance literature.182 I’m asking a simpler, and arguably prior, question 
about underlying empirics.  Given that shareholders’ and the corporation’s 
interests are intertwined in the relevant factual situation, what 
(psychologically) explains the indifference to the potential harm befalling 
their clients’ shareholders?  
Perhaps this indifference is a natural consequence of internalizing the 
views of corporate managers, who may feel latent disdain about 
shareholder constituents who, if sufficiently consolidated or organized, can 
potentially upset managerial agendas.183 Perhaps this indifference is also a 
by-product of the formation of a strong in-group identity. Psychologist 
Henri Tajfel and his colleagues have demonstrated that the “‘mere 
categorization’ of people into different nominal groups . . . can elicit 
favoritism toward in-group members” and disparagement of out-group 
                                                                                                                     
 180. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. F (2000) (noting 
that, “[I]f the threatened injury is substantial the lawyer must proceed in what the lawyer reasonably 
believes to be the best interests of the organization.”).  
 181. At least some of the violations serious enough to trigger the reporting procedures under 
Part 205 and Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 would qualify as securities frauds. In those cases, the 
corporation’s own shareholders are deemed to be the victims of fraud. Assuming that most 
significant frauds are eventually revealed, the corporation must ordinarily compensate the defrauded 
shareholders—either through judgment or settlement. This potentially enormous payout will be 
charged against earnings and will result in a negative share price adjustment. For those material law 
violations not involving securities frauds, many of them will nonetheless be imputed to the 
corporation—either expressly by statute or by operation of the principle of respondeat superior. 
Accordingly, the company itself may be subject to civil or criminal liability, which would, in turn, 
adversely impact share price. Also, in the long run, a pattern of material violations will likely 
undermine the company’s share price by impairing the company’s reputation for financial integrity. 
Thus, there should be no doubt that plausible cases of material law violations may negatively impact 
share price, necessarily implicating both the corporation’s and its shareholders’ interests. See Kim, 
supra note 12, at 132–33. 
 182. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833, 836 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2006); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True 
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate 
America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1759–60 (2006). 
 183. One classic situation where managerial interests may diverge significantly from 
shareholder interests is with respect to acquisitions and anti-takeover defenses. See, e.g., Iman 
Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 586–88 
(2006). 
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members.184 Accordingly, to the extent that lawyers socially identify 
themselves with management and not shareholders, they are likely to favor 
management and derogate shareholders, who may be regarded as the out-
group. 
Another explanation is that lawyers simply cannot garner the threshold 
amount of empathy for shareholders, who—with some exceptions—are 
statistical victims of managerial misconduct. We can all recall instances 
where specific victims of misfortune draw tremendous public attention and 
sympathy. Need I say more than “Baby Jessica”?185 By contrast, we all 
know how difficult it is to persuade the general public that we should all 
share the financial burden of providing health care for the millions of 
unnamed, uninsured Americans. As noted by Nobel laureate Thomas 
Schelling in his economic analysis of risk, the death of a known individual 
invokes “anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe, responsibility and 
religion. . . . But most of this awesomeness disappears when we deal with 
statistical deaths.”186 More ominously, Joseph Stalin once said, “The death 
of a single Russian soldier is a tragedy. A million deaths is a statistic.”187 
Research on behavioral decision-making in psychology and economics 
reveals that people show less empathy for statistical victims (who have not 
yet been identified) than for identifiable victims.188 In one field experiment 
conducted by Professors Deborah Small and George Loewenstein, 
researchers approached potential donors with a letter requesting money to 
buy materials for a house to be built for a needy family through the Habitat 
for Humanity organization.189 Excluding names, the letter briefly described 
the characteristics of several families on the waiting list to move into 
homes. Researchers informed half of the participants that the recipient 
family “has been selected” and the other half that the family “will be 
selected” from the list. In neither condition were participants told about 
which particular family had been or would be selected.190  
                                                                                                                     
 184. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 97, at 40 (citing findings by psychologist Henri Tajfel); 
Henri Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination, 223 SCI. AM. 96, 101–02 (1970) (reporting 
finding that simply classifying children based on their preferences for the paintings of Paul Klee or 
Wassily Kandinsky resulted in subjects’ allocating greater money to members of their in-group as 
opposed to the out-group); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 
1533–34 (2005); Kim, supra note 41, at 1022. 
 185. Eighteen-month old Jessica McClure, widely known as “Baby Jessica,” was trapped in a 
Texas well for fifty-eight hours in 1987. In response to media pleas, the family received more than 
$700,000 in public donations for the rescue effort. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, 
Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 235–36 (1997); 
Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and 
Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2003). 
 186. Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127, 142 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968). 
 187. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS 
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43 (1980) (quoting Joseph Stalin). 
 188. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 185, at 5. 
 189. Id. at 11. 
 190. Id.  
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Given that the only difference between the two conditions was whether 
the recipient family had already been selected, one might reasonably expect 
that both groups of participants would contribute similar amounts. To the 
contrary, more people contributed and contributed significantly more 
money when the recipient family had already been determined than when 
the family had not yet been determined.191 As the authors of the studies 
suggest, a determined victim of misfortune may stimulate a more powerful, 
affective response, inducing altruism. By contrast, an undetermined or 
statistical victim may invoke more deliberative, calculative cognitive 
processes that are more characteristic of emotional detachment.192  
Other studies demonstrate that we lack empathy for groups of victims 
(regardless of whether they’ve been identified) as compared to a single 
identified victim.193 It may simply be easier for people to adopt the 
perspective of a single identified individual, who is a psychologically 
coherent unit, compared to the multiple perspectives of a group of 
individuals, which may strain the perceiver’s processing capacity.194 
Recent follow-up research also suggests these types of effects may 
translate into greater tolerance for unethical behavior when victims are 
unidentified.195 
What is the significance of these findings in explaining the legal 
profession’s resistance to gatekeeping? If people are generally 
unsympathetic to a group of unidentified or unidentifiable victims,196 then 
we should expect lawyers to be callous about the harm that may befall a 
client’s public shareholders. After all, shareholders are the textbook 
examples of victims for whom we cannot generate empathy. With the 
exception of a small number of activist shareholders, shareholders are 
numerous, diverse, abstract (especially if they are institutional), and often 
unidentifiable at any particular moment in time by virtue of the anonymous 
securities trading markets. Accordingly, lawyers may be more tolerant of 
ethically questionable behavior that risks harm to these shareholders. 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Id. at 12 (statistically significant difference of p = 0.05). 
 192. Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein & Paul Slovic, Sympathy and Callousness: The 
Impact of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143, 143–45 (2007). 
 193. Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Identified Group, or Just 
a Single Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 165 (2005) (noting that the results of 
their study to support the hypothesis that a “single identified victim evokes stronger feelings than an 
unidentified single victim, or a group of victims, regardless of their being identified or not”—the 
singularity effect).  
 194. Id. at 158, 159, 165. 
 195. Francesca Gino, Lisa L. Shu & Max H. Bazerman, Nameless + Harmless = Blameless: 
When Seemingly Irrelevant Factors Influence Judgment of (Un)ethical Behavior 8, 17–22 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch. NOM Working Paper, Paper No. 09-020, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1238661 (concluding that people tend to judge others’ ethically 
questionable behavior less harshly when the victim of the wrongdoing is unidentified). 
 196. The distinction between “identifiable” and “actually identified” victims is not material to 
this Article’s analysis, as—with few exceptions—shareholders are often both unidentified and 
unidentifiable from the lawyer’s perspective at any particular moment in time. 
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Moreover, lawyers will not be eager about having to safeguard the interests 
of such an abstract class of victims, especially if doing so feels like 
betraying the senior corporate managers—the living, breathing humans 
whose preferences they have internalized. In addition, we should expect 
that lawyers will likewise feel indifferent to the interests of the abstract 
corporation to whom they, by law, owe their fiduciary duties. 
Comment letters confirm that lawyers are generally indifferent to 
shareholders as a class, who are seen as a “diverse and, for the most part, 
unknown group of constituents.”197 Lawyers dismiss the suggestion that 
shareholder interests should be considered in defining the lawyer’s duty to 
the corporate client. They argue that the creation of a “direct duty to broad 
classes of diverse shareholders, most of whom have widely varying 
interests and objectives . . . would undoubtedly create impermissible 
conflicts.”198 Others “seriously doubt that there is any ‘best interest of 
shareholders’ that can be discerned for a publicly held corporation,” given 
that the “interests of shareholders are very diverse.”199 And still others 
think it nothing less than “ludicrous to believe that an attorney can 
‘represent’ much less protect the interests of such a disparate group.”200  
Now, as Professor Iman Anabtawi has argued, shareholders do in fact 
have diverse—and often conflicting—interests.201 Accordingly, any reform 
seeking to redefine the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to incorporate explicitly 
shareholder interests must deal with the unintended consequences of doing 
so.202 But the bar’s contention that the lawyer’s fiduciary duty should not 
be so expanded is, quite simply, a red herring. After all, on the narrow 
issue of requiring lawyers to interdict the material, unrectified illegalities 
of managers, there is no conflict of interest.203 In fact, for the issue at hand, 
the interests of the corporate client and its shareholders happen to be 
perfectly aligned.204 As a result, a redefinition of the lawyer’s fiduciary 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Munger, Tolles & Olson Letter, supra note 178. 
 198. Letter from Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett LLP to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jblevan1.htm. 
 199. LACBA Letter, supra note 178. 
 200. Letter from Compass Bancshares, Inc. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jwpowell1.htm. 
 201. See Anabtawi, supra note 183, at 577 (2006) (noting inherent difficulties in discerning 
what shareholder interests are due to “deep rifts among the interests of modern shareholders”). 
 202. See id. at 574–75 (noting that increasing shareholder power might result in certain 
shareholders pursuing their own private interests to the detriment of shareholders as a class). 
 203. See Kim, supra note 12, at 113–16. 
 204. To the extent that material illegalities perpetrated by managers are likely to be eventually 
revealed in the marketplace, the company and its shareholders have common interests in preventing 
or rectifying illegalities before greater damage to the company is done. Securities law scholars 
believe that actionable securities frauds are particularly susceptible to ultimate detection. See, e.g., 
Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory 
and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701 (arguing that fraud-on-the-market securities frauds are 
likely to be revealed). Once revealed, the company’s share prices will likely drop, which can’t be 
good either for the company or the company’s investors.  To be sure, prior to the fraud’s revelation, 
any particular investor might benefit in the short term when selling his shares to another investor at 
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duty is not necessary.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Why do lawyers resist gatekeeping? On the one hand, if you take the 
official rhetoric of the bar at face value, it is because lawyers are 
professionally obligated to do so. Resistance reflects virtue. On the other 
hand, if you adopt a cynical approach, it’s just lawyers chasing their 
economic self-interest. Follow the money. Resistance reflects vice. Of 
course, the truth is always somewhere in between. It is economic self-
interest, but not in the way we commonly think of it (for example, lawyers 
intentionally lying to the public or regulators in order to line their own 
pockets). Rather, it is economic self-interest warping cognition. It is vice, 
but not of a venal sort. It’s rather banal.205 
In addition to self-interest, unconscious efforts to reduce cognitive 
dissonance will lead to the internalization of the interests of those senior 
corporate managers serving as the clients’ representatives. This mechanism 
overlaps somewhat with self-interest but not entirely. Finally, it’s how we 
think of—or more accurately, fail to think of—the statistical victim that is 
the shareholder. These three cognitive processes—self-interested 
motivation, internalization of managers’ views as a product of cognitive 
dissonance, and indifference to abstract shareholders—explain why 
lawyers resist gatekeeping duties. Consequently, when lawyers advance 
principled arguments about why gatekeeping is not their job, we should 
consider those arguments with a healthy dose of skepticism.   
Given these tendencies, one might ask: why should we rely on lawyers 
at all when all the evidence shows that they would make lousy public 
gatekeepers? Shouldn’t Congress, courts, and the SEC just throw up their 
hands in resignation, realizing the futility of trying to convert lawyers into 
gatekeepers? But we live in a world of neither perfect solutions nor ideal 
gatekeepers, so the relevant issue is not so much whether lawyers make 
good gatekeepers in some absolute sense but always as compared to what? 
Here is not the place to provide a complete answer to that question, which 
would require an institutional comparison of the efficacy of other existing 
gatekeepers, including accountants, investment bankers, and boards of 
directors.206 Suffice it to say that, for purposes of this Article, it seems odd 
                                                                                                                     
a fraudulently inflated price. However, no investor benefits if fraud becomes rampant enough to 
drive both honest issuers and investors from the capital markets. Moreover, recent research casts 
doubt on claims that investors may suffer no or negligible net harm from fraud over the long term. 
See Alicia Davis Evans, Are Investors’ Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud Equal over Time? 
Some Preliminary Evidence 5–6 (Michigan Law Empirical Legal Studies Working Paper, Paper No. 
09-002, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121198. 
 205. In prior work, I have distinguished between the “venality hypothesis” and the “banality 
hypothesis.” See Kim, supra note 41, at 988–97.  
 206. In prior work, I identified four criteria by which gatekeepers may be comparatively 
assessed. They are (1) the willingness to interdict, (2) the willingness to monitor, (3) the capacity to 
monitor, and (4) the capacity to interdict. Kim, supra note 16, at 421–22 (discussing the “Four 
Quadrants of Gatekeeping”). 
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to exempt those professionals who are presumably most adept at 
identifying law violations.207 
Lawyers perceive it to be in their self-interest to resist gatekeeping 
because they are myopic. In the long run, gatekeeping actually serves the 
legal profession’s self-interest because “lawyers are valuable to their 
clients to the extent, but only to the extent, that they can be trusted by 
constituents and third parties not to game the system in a way that damages 
the entity, the integrity of the capital markets, and the legal framework.”208 
As noted by Robert Gordon, “If it turns out not only that [lawyers] are 
gaming the system to suppress and distort facts that make corporations 
look bad, and hype and inflate facts that make them look good, they lose 
the power to legitimate/validate corporate conduct.”209  
One need only look at the historical lesson provided by the accounting 
profession to see how a profession can be catastrophically short-sighted. 
As Professor John Coffee has argued, by persistently resisting clearly 
defined gatekeeping obligations and by “tolerating a disciplinary system 
that amounted to little more than a charade, the [accounting] profession 
ensured that eventually such a system of private self-regulation would 
become politically unacceptable.”210 In the wake of the extraordinary audit 
failures that culminated in the corporate fiascoes of Enron and WorldCom, 
Sarbanes-Oxley ended the self-regulation of accountants by creating a 
public regulatory body—the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board—to regulate auditing.211 Securities lawyers should be reminded of 
the possibility of a similar fate. 
In spite of the dour diagnosis that I have presented in this Article, there 
is cause for guarded optimism. There is decent evidence that individual 
lawyers—at least on some level—hunger to be more ethical and want to 
                                                                                                                     
 207. It seems especially odd to exempt lawyers from gatekeeping if the persistence and 
prevalence of white collar crime is explained more by the prohibitive costs of detection rather than 
inadequate sanctions. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888 (1984); see also Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights 
Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (noting 
the complexity of white collar crime and the inherent difficulties in prosecuting them). Using the 
terminology that I developed in prior work, lawyers may have a superior “capacity to monitor” than 
other professionals, given lawyers’ relative expertise (by virtue of their education and training) in 
identifying law violations (at least for those violations that are not pure accounting frauds). For an 
analysis comparing the expertise of inside and outside counsel, see Kim, supra note 16, at 455–57. 
Also, as noted by Deborah Rhode, among the various gatekeepers, lawyers are most qualified “to 
advise on what would satisfy the purpose and spirit, as well as letter, of the law.” Rhode, supra note 
47, at 1331. For an analysis of how legal issues were important and arguably central even in the 
Enron (accounting) fraud, see Regan, supra note 12, at 1140–43. 
 208. Kim, supra note 12, at 135 n.372 (paraphrasing Robert Gordon). 
 209. E-mail from Robert Gordon to author (July 17, 2009, 1:04 PST) (on file with author). 
 210. JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 170 
(2006). 
 211. Id. at 142–43. Of course, it remains to be seen whether this body will be an aggressive 
regulator of auditing. Id. at 377. 
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assume a greater role in counseling clients to observe the law.212 But 
lawyers are reluctant to risk “offending a client by the advice” they give or 
the public positions they support,213 especially if doing so simply results in 
clients going elsewhere to find lawyers with more malleable consciences. 
Also, given the state of background norms of corporate representation, 
characterized by the prevailing “ethic of uncritical loyalty to the client,”214 
lawyers will hesitate to go against the grain and be the audacious norms 
entrepreneur.215 
Since individual lawyers suffer from massive collective action 
problems that prevent them from going against these norms,216 bar 
associations can play a vital role by doing two things. First, they can 
affirmatively define law-respecting norms by inculcating a prima facie duty 
to urge compliance with the law217 and stop promulgating rules and 
rhetoric that signal to lawyers that it is “illegitimate to adopt an attitude of 
discretionary judgment toward their clients’ . . . ends.”218 Second, instead 
                                                                                                                     
 212. In Nelson’s aforementioned survey of Chicago lawyers, “[m]ore than three-quarters of the 
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of third parties). Only 8.1% of the lawyers who had never refused work said that “personal values 
should not dictate what a lawyer does.” See NELSON, supra note 145, at 255–56. In another survey 
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 213. Gordon, supra note 113, at 287. 
 214. Id. at 292. 
 215. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996) 
(defining “norm entrepreneurs” as “people interested in changing social norms”). 
 216. Id. at 948 (noting that individuals “cannot bring about the change on their own, because 
in his individual capacity, each person has limited power to alter meanings, norms, or roles” and 
noting the government’s role in solving collective action problems). 
 217. See Gordon, supra note 113, at 279 (observing that lawyers “have no positive duty to 
urge compliance or to go beyond ‘purely technical’ advice if that is all the client wants”). A prima 
facie duty to urge compliance with the law can derive from a prima facie duty to obey the law. See 
David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty 
to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1996).  
 218. Gordon, supra note 44, at 57. As noted by Gordon, lawyers “have virtually no formal 
leverage over clients who persist in illegal conduct, since they may disclose misconduct to outsiders 
only in extreme situations, and may not even resign unless the company’s highest authority resolves 
to proceed with a ‘clear’ violation of law likely to result in ‘substantial injury’ to the organization.” 
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of resisting gatekeeping, they can embrace it and acknowledge the 
necessity of prosecuting securities lawyers who assist corporate frauds. 
Since the bar isn’t doing it,219 it should candidly acknowledge that 
someone else should. Bar leaders would also do well to examine the 
lessons learned from the plight of the accounting profession to re-evaluate 
the legal profession’s own self-interest. 
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Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1991); David B. Wilkins, 
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Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 
2002) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm) (expressing SEC’s 
frustration about the “generally low level of effective responses we receive from state bar 
committees when we refer possible disciplinary proceedings to them”); Cramton et al., supra note 
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